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"Stipulate? We Don't Need No Stinking Stipulation!":
Can the Prosecution Be Forced to Stipulate to
Facts That It Would Rather Prove?
by Daniel D. Blinka

Most people hate doing
unnecessary work, particularly prosecutors who
bear the heavy burden of
proving every element of
a charged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. If a
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defendant offered to
concede an element, i.e.,
stipulate to its existence,
one would think the prosecutor would quickly
(if not graciously) accept.
The defendant in this
case wanted to do just
that but the United States
resisted. Now the
Supreme Court decides
if a defendant can force a
prosecutor to accept a
stipulation regarding an
element of the
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crime charged.
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Modern criminal law assigns liability
based on what the defendant did,
not who he or she is or what he or
she represents. Thus, the elements
of most crimes eschew any mention
of the defendant's status, focusing
with surgical detail on the nature of
the defendant's acts and his or her
accompanying state of mind.
The law of evidence is in accord.
In theory, the prosecution cannot
introduce evidence of the defendant's "bad" character to show that
the defendant committed the crime
in question.
A narrow band of crimes is different. In some instances, Congress
has made the defendant's status as a
convicted felon an element of the
crime. In these cases, the nature of
the crime requires the prosecution
to prove that the defendant is a
felon, although the evidence that
establishes the defendant's prior
criminal status cannot be used,
again in theory, to show that the
defendant committed the crime
now being charged.
Juries are, of course, tempted to
draw the forbidden inference from
bad character to other criminal conduct, including the crime charged,
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regardless of what the trial judge
says to the contrary. To minimize
the damage, some defendants offer
to stipulate to their status as felons
in order to preclude prosecutors
from spilling the unsavory details of
their past misdeeds before the jury.
Defendants hope, perhaps naively,
that jurors will not infer the worst.
Prosecutors, however, often spurn
the favor because proving the defendant's felony status is usually a "no
brainer" and has the added benefit
of exposing the jury to details of the
defendant's criminal past, thus
inevitably coloring its attitude
toward the defendant.

ISSUE
The question before the Supreme
Court in this case involves both the
way we define crimes and the rules
governing the evidence that juries
hear about those crimes. In cases in
which the defendant is charged
under federal law with being a felon
in possession of a firearm ("felon in
possession") and the defendant
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offers to stipulate to his status as a
felon, should the trial court require
the Government to accept the
stipulation, thereby precluding the
Government from offering any evidence concerning the factual nature
of the prior felony conviction?

FACTS
The charges against petitioner
Johnny Lynn Old Chief arose from
an evening of drinking on the
Blackfeet Indian Reservation in
Browning, Montana. In the course of
the evening, Old Chief got into a
fistfight with Anthony Calf Looking
outside a liquor store. During the
fracas, a handgun was fired. One
witness, Ms. Everybody Talks About,
identified Old Chief as the shooter.
Police later found the gun in a pickup truck in which Old Chief had
been riding. In Old Chiefs pockets,
police found bullets and a spent
shell casing that matched the
caliber of the gun.
Federal prosecutors filed three
charges against Old Chief. Count I
charged that Old Chief was a felon
in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994).
Old Chiefs status as felon, i.e., having been convicted of a crime carrying a punishment of more than one
year imprisonment, was tied to a
1989 conviction for assault resulting
in serious bodily injury.
Count II alleged that Old Chief used
or carried the firearm during, or in
relation to, a crime of violence the fight with Calf Looking - in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Count III charged assault with a
deadly weapon, again involving the
fight with Calf Looking, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 113(c).
Old Chief filed a pretrial motion in
which he offered to stipulate that he
had been convicted of a felony, an
essential element of the felon-inpossession charge, and proposed

that the jury be instructed that he
"has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year." In support of
the motion, Old Chief argued that he
would be unfairly prejudiced on the
assault charges (Counts II and Ill) if
the jury learned that he had been
previously convicted of assault
resulting in serious bodily injury the basis for the felon-in-possession
charge alleged in Count I. In short,
Old Chief argued that only his status
as a felon was at issue, not the
nature of the underlying felony
conviction, and that his willingness
to concede his status should end
the matter.
The Government opposed the
motion, arguing that it had a right
to prove its case. Conceding that
unfair prejudice could arise if the
Government piled on the prior convictions, the prosecutor pointed out
that Old Chief had other serious
prior convictions, including one for
robbery, that were not alleged in the
indictment and would not be raised
before the jury.
The trial judge sided with the
Government. He ruled that if the
prosecutor "doesn't want to
stipulate, he doesn't have to."
The case proceeded to trial before a
jury. Over objection by Old Chiefs
counsel, the prosecutor introduced
into the record a certified copy of
the 1989 criminal judgment against
Old Chief, which stated that Old
Chief had knowingly and unlawfully
assaulted the victim who sustained
serious bodily injury. The judgment
also reflected Old Chiefs 60-month
sentence for the 1989 crime.
The prosecutor referred to the 1989
conviction during both the opening
statement and closing arguments.
The judge also addressed the prior
conviction in jury instructions,
explaining that Old Chief could be
found guilty of the felon-in-posses-

sion count only if he had been convicted previously of an offense punishable by more than one year in
prison and that the 1989 assault
conviction was such an offense.
Finally, the jury was given the certified copy of the 1989 judgment to
examine during its deliberations.
The jury convicted Old Chief on all
three counts. Old Chief appealed to
the Ninth Circuit which, in an
unpublished opinion, vacated
Old Chiefs sentence (on other
grounds) but rejected his argument
that given his offer to stipulate, the
admission of the 1989 conviction
contravened Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence ("Rule
403"). (Rule 403 provides that
"relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice . . . ." to the party
seeking exclusion.)
The Ninth Circuit ruled that
regardless of Old Chiefs offer to
stipulate, the Government was
"entitled to prove a prior felony
offense through introduction of
probative evidence." Thus, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the
trial judge had not abused his
discretion in refusing to require
that the Government accept Old
Chiefs offer to stipulate to his
status as a felon. It is this decision
that the Supreme Court reviews,
having granted Old Chiefs petition
for a writ of certiorari. 116 S.Ct.
907 (1996).
CASE ANALYSIS
There are two different but closely
related issues in this case. The first
issue involves how a crime is
defined and the second relates to
how it can be proved.
Old Chief argues that the plain
language of Section 922(g)(1), the
felon-in-possession criminal
statute, requires proof only that
(Continued on Page 3)
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the defendant who possessed the
firearm had been convicted of a
crime punishable by imprisonment
exceeding one year. Thus, Old Chief
insists the nature and description of
the prior felony are not essential
elements of the felon-in-possession
crime; nor does the prior felony element require any consideration of
the defendant's conduct that merited the earlier felony conviction. In
short, Old Chief argues that
Congress did not intend that the
jury learn anything more than the
bare fact of a prior conviction and
that it was punishable by more than
one year of imprisonment.
The Government responds by pointing out that Section 922(g)(1) does
not apply to all prior convictions.
Specifically, Congress excluded various business crimes and some state
law misdemeanors punishable by
less than two years in prison. Thus,
the Government maintains that it
must be allowed to prove the nature
of the earlier conviction to establish
that it is not among the excluded
list of crimes. In the Government's
view, both the structure and legislative history of the felon-in-possession statute reflect congressional
intent that specific evidence of the
prior felony conviction is ordinarily
admissible.
The second issue brings to the fore
the nature of the adversary system
and the Federal Rules of Evidence
that govern how the parties in federal court are permitted to prove their
respective cases. Although the Rules
of Evidence mostly preclude the
Government from proving the
defendant's bad character, Old Chief
acknowledges that the defendant's
status as a convicted felon is an
essential element of the felon-inpossession crime. It is altogether
unavoidable, then, that the jury will
learn, at the very least, about the
defendant's past felony conviction;
but, argues Old Chief, the prosecu-

tion goes too far by proving details
about the nature of the prior felony
or the conduct that gave rise to the
earlier conviction.
Rule 403 gives federal district judges
the authority to exclude even relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by other
considerations, such as unfair prejudice. And the unfair prejudice is
amplified in cases such as this one
because the felon-in-possession
charge is joined with other charges
that closely resemble the prior
felony conviction. In other words,
the unfair prejudice is dangerously
higher when the defendant faces
trial for the same kind of violent
conduct that gave rise to the prior
felony conviction. In such circumstances, the jury could be irresistibly tempted to draw the forbidden inference of bad character and
propensity to commit crimes.
For these reasons, Old Chief contends that a defendant's offer to
stipulate to his status as a felon
must be accepted. The judge should
instruct the jury that "the defendant
has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, thus satisfying
the prior felony conviction element
of Section 922(g)(1)."
The stipulation obviates the need
for any additional proof on this
element. If the prosecution wants to
inject evidence of the defendant's
criminal past, it must comply with
the exceptions to the rules of evidence that generally ban evidence
of bad character.
Old Chief maintains that the trial
judge abused his discretion by
spurning Old Chiefs offer to stipulate and allowing the prosecutor to
dredge up superfluous details about
the earlier conviction for assault
causing bodily injury.

The Government responds by arguing that it must come forward with
some details about the prior felony
conviction in order to show that it
qualifies under the nonexhaustive
list of predicate felonies. See 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). An offer to stipulate in no way affects the relevancy
of such evidence.
The Government also argues that
Rule 403 does not bar such evidence
despite the defendant's offer to stipulate. According to the Government,
Congress definitively struck the Rule
403 balance on the side of admitting
evidence of the facts surrounding a
prior felony conviction. Moreover,
Congress intended that ordinarily
the jury would be apprised of the
details of the prior felony.
The Government contends that its
reading of Congress' intent also
comports with the traditional presumption that a prosecutor does not
have to accept a defendant's stipulation to an element of an offense
when it might deprive the prosecutor of the moral force of the evidence. Put another way, a prosecutor can elect to accept or reject the
defendant's stipulation depending on
a tactical assessment of what works
best. In the Government's view, forcing a prosecutor to accept the defendant's stipulation invites the "defendant to stipulate away all but the
most hotly contested aspect of the
charged offense" and reduces "the
jury's role to resolving abstract, isolated factual questions."
In this case, argues the Government,
the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the prosecutor to
spurn the proffered stipulation. Old
Chiefs proposed stipulation fell
short of a concession that the element was established. Not only did
the prosecution have to offer some
evidence on this element, but its
proof was noninflammatory and
avoided details about the prior
felony assault conviction.
Issue No. 1

SIGNIFICANCE
Old Chief's appeal raises issues that
are somewhat technical yet have
far-reaching repercussions for the
adversary system. The more mundane issue involves the precise
definition of the offense proscribed
by the felon-in-possession statute.
Is the prosecutor restricted to the
naked fact that the offense was punishable by imprisonment in excess
of one year? Or may the prosecutor
prove the factual nature of the prior
felony, perhaps with some background detail as well?
The federal circuit courts of appeals
are split over this issue, so the
Supreme Court's guidance will
alleviate the reigning confusion.
Compare United States v. Tavares,
21 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994) (nature of
prior felony irrelevant to a Section
922(g)(1) offense); United States v.
GiUiam, 994 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1993)
(same); United States v. Spletzer,
535 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1976)
(same); United States v. Milton,
52 F.3d 78 (7th Cir. 1995) (same);
United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d
1453 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); and
United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (same) with Old
Chief v. United States, 56 F.3d 75
(9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished opinion, judgment noted in table) (the
Government has the right to introduce evidence concerning the facts
surrounding the prior felony conviction supporting the felon-in-possession charge).
Lurking just below the surface are
issues of much greater moment.
Section 922(g)(1) showcases the
defendant's status as a convicted
felon as a matter of fact for the jury
to consider. By making this status
an element of a Section 922(g)(1)
crime, Congress compels prosecutors to introduce some evidence
that the defendant is a criminal
despite mountains of precedent that
normally forbids proof of the defen-
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dant's bad character, unless the
defendant first opens the door to the
issue or the prosecutor can demonstrate admissibility under other
rules, neither of which was applicable in this case.
Defense lawyers view such prioroffense elements as little more than
a subterfuge for putting evidence of
a defendant's criminal character
before juries which are often less
than sympathetic to people with
criminal backgrounds. Indeed, Old
Chief points out that a prosecutor's
manual strongly recommends using
criminal background information
"in the manner most advantageous
to the Government." And where the
predicate felony closely resembles
some of the underlying offenses, as
the assault counts mirrored Old
Chief's 1989 conviction, the jury will
be sorely tempted to use the earlier
crime as proof of the defendant's
criminal propensity.
Prosecutors counter that narrowly
drawn stipulations can gut their
cases, leaving only abstract issues
that resonate little with juries.
Deprived of the whole story, juries
might be more prone to nullify; that
is, juries might acquit despite overwhelming evidence of guilt.
This concern could be a particularly
pressing problem in cases involving
firearms because some jurors might
well question the fundamental validity of prosecuting people for possessing a firearm. The less the jury
knows about the defendant's background or why it was illegal for the
defendant to possess a firearm, the
more likely it may be that the jury
will strain to find a reason to acquit.
The danger is exacerbated when the
defendant's offer to stipulate falls
short of an unequivocal concession
that proves the prior felony-conviction element.

Finally, the adversary system
traditionally allows the parties
great latitude to try their cases as
they see fit. Trial lawyers are justifiably wary of proffered stipulations
because they are most often
motivated by a desire to soften the
blow of overwhelming, negative
evidence.
In criminal cases, prosecutors
must convince jurors beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime
occurred, a subjective test defying
precise calibration but demanding
an extraordinarily compelling display of evidence. This stringent
burden of proof leaves prosecutors
unwilling to surrender any opportunity to show their strength (not
to mention picking up the collateral, if illicit, advantage of bad character evidence). In short, forcing
trial lawyers to accept stipulations
runs counter to a fundamental
feature of the adversary system allowing the parties advance their
most compelling case.
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